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Abstract 
A study of siting considerations for possible future 
accelerators at Fermilab is underway. Each candidate 
presents important challenges in environment, safety, and 
health (ES&H) that are reviewed generically in this paper. 
Some of these considerations are similar to those that 
have been encountered and solved during the construction 
and operation of other accelerator facilities. Others have 
not been encountered previously on the same scale. The 
novel issues will require particular attention coincident 
with project design efforts to assure their timely cost-
effective resolution. It is concluded that with adequate 
planning, the issues can be addressed in a manner that 
merits the support of the Laboratory, the U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE), and the public.  
1 REGULATORY MATTERS 
Any future accelerator at Fermilab will have to meet 
specified standards in the area of ES&H. Contractual 
requirements in ES&H are Fermilab’s Work Smart 
Standards that are updated annually[1]. Requirements in 
the contract under which a future accelerator might 
operate could be different. 
 
1.1 Environmental Protection 
Any new federally-funded facility must be reviewed 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)[2]. 
An Environmental Assessment (EA), conducted by DOE, 
will cover all possible impacts on the environment and the 
public of construction, operations, and decommissioning. 
The EA will cover topics that are generally associated 
with environmental protection such as the discharge of 
pollutants; effects upon floodplains, wetlands, and 
groundwater; and exposures of people to chemicals and 
radiation. Also included are societal impacts such as 
levels of employment, traffic, noise, and environmental 
justice. The alternatives of carrying out the project 
elsewhere or not at all are addressed. DOE may choose to 
require the preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) if impacts identified in the EA are 
significant and unavoidable. It is likely that an EIS will be 
required for any facility that extends beyond the present 
boundary of the Fermilab site. The duration of the EIS 
process is measured in units of years. Aside from early 
conceptual design efforts, project funds cannot be issued 
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prior to successful completion of the NEPA process. It is 
thus crucial that this work be initiated early and conducted 
in a manner that comprehensively addresses the potential 
concerns of the public and DOE. DOE will choose the 
venues for public input. 
There are state and federal environmental permits and 
approvals to obtain from entities such as the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Illinois Environmental 
Protection Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 
Illinois Department of Natural Resources. The U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, the Illinois Historic Preservation 
Agency, and possibly others are likely to have comments 
on permit issues. These permits would apply to such 
topics as storm water discharges, discharge of process 
cooling water, wetlands impacts, construction in 
floodplains, the pumping of groundwater, and releases of 
air pollutants both non-radioactive and radioactive. 
Potential archaeological sites might need further study 
prior to construction. Lead times of a year or more to 
obtain an appropriate permit are commonly required. 
Compared to more conventional facilities a large 
accelerator is likely to be viewed by regulators as a poorly 
understood, esoteric technology. Thus, early coordination 
with regulatory agencies is highly desirable. 
 
1.2 Safety and Health 
The preparation of a Safety Assessment Document 
(SAD) covering the ES&H issues will be required, likely 
preceded by a preliminary SAD (PSAD)[1]. The PSAD is 
intended to identify relevant ES&H issues at an early 
stage (prior to detailed design) while the SAD documents 
the resolution of these matters. Environmental issues are 
integrated into the PSAD/SAD process as a part of 
integrated safety management. DOE will likely choose to 
review the SAD, perhaps by using an external review 
team. Just prior to facility operation, a formal readiness 
review would be required. A careful, consistent approach 
to NEPA/PSAD/SAD issues at early stages will be of 
significant benefit.  
 
1.3 Future Conditions 
DOE is presently "self-regulating" in the areas of 
industrial safety and occupational radiation protection. 
There is a possibility that during the development of the 
next accelerator facility, DOE activities might become 
subject to "external" regulation in these areas. Further, the 
standards in Ref. 1 are subject to modification from time-
to-time as are external regulations. The "ground rules" 
applicable to a particular facility will be the contemporary 
ones. 
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2 ISSUES DURING CONSTRUCTION 
2.1 Safety and Health  
Any of the accelerators being considered will involve a 
great deal of underground construction. Where the 
conventional "cut and fill" method is used near the 
surface, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s (OSHA’s) regulations on the safety of 
construction activities will be followed[1]. Particular 
requirements for excavations, personnel protective 
equipment, emergency response measures, means of 
egress, fire safety, chemical safety, and electrical safety 
will apply. In some candidate facilities significant slopes 
may be involved. Effective means of preventing accidents 
due to heavy objects moving downhill are needed. 
Several candidate facilities involve considerable 
tunneling in bedrock, in some places horizontal and in 
others at significant slopes. Regulations pertaining to 
underground operations (e.g., "mining") supplement more 
general requirements. These include concerns about 
tunneling safety and transport of material as the tunneling 
proceeds. Construction methods will likely utilize a 
combination of drilling and blasting and tunnel boring 
machines. Provisions for emergency response and means 
of egress are needed and underground rescues must be 
planned for. The current NuMI project is providing 
valuable experience with regard to these issues. In 
addition, the prevention of tunnel flooding must be 
accomplished in harmony with environmental protection 
concerns related to water discharge (see Section 2.2). 
During construction, industrial radiography is likely to 
be employed to provide adequate quality assurance of 
pipe welds, etc. Radioactive sources used in such work 
produce much more intense radiation fields than do those 
commonly used in particle physics experiments. 
Likewise, radiation-generating machines used for this 
purpose present significant hazards. The radiographic 
operations must be conducted in compliance with specific 
regulatory requirements. 
Finally, noises heard, vibrations felt, or lights seen at 
night by members of the public can present public 
relations problems that must be addressed successfully. 
 
2.2 Environmental Protection 
All candidate facilities would be placed nearly entirely 
underground. Some portions will be located near the 
surface, in the glacial till, while others will be located 
deep underground in bedrock. Both point and non-point 
sources of surface water contamination will require one or 
more permits under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). Well-engineered erosion 
control measures, consistent with relevant regulatory 
guidance will be needed to limit dust and runoff from 
spoil piles and to manage stormwater discharges. 
Tunneling in bedrock produces a considerable volume 
of spoil, such as pulverized rock, that must be properly 
managed. Construction in aquifers will result in the need 
to protect drinking water resources from contamination. 
The dewatering of tunnels will motivate the use of 
measures to prevent the depletion of wells and effectively 
manage surface water discharges to meet permit 
conditions. Water quality standards for both individual 
and municipal wells must be met. Careful hydrogeologic 
studies will be needed to create successful engineering 
solutions to these issues. The current NuMI project is 
providing valuable experience in some of these issues. 
During construction activities, precautions are needed 
to guarantee that spills of chemicals, including lubricants 
and fuels from the construction equipment, are captured 
before they enter surface or groundwater. 
3 ISSUES DURING OPERATIONS 
3.1 Safety and Health-"Ordinary" Hazards  
A number of occupational safety hazards, addressable 
using standard techniques, that are found at other large 
particle accelerators will be present in all of the candidate 
facilities.  The following is a short list: 
 
• Large electrical currents needing lockout/tagout,  
• RF generation and other non-ionizing radiation,  
• Fire protection concerns associated with cables, 
• Radiation damage of safety equipment, 
• Flammable materials, including detector gases, and 
• Movement and alignment of large components.  
3.2 Safety and Health-"Novel" Hazards 
Some proposed facilities involve novel hazards not 
previously addressed on a similar scale.  These are 
discussed here. The technique of peer review may be 
useful in addressing these issues by enlarging the base of 
available expertise. 
Large Scale Use of Cryogens-The next generation of 
accelerators are likely to use superconductors and 
cryogenics in magnets and RF structures. Standard 
engineering practices and review mechanisms should be 
employed to assure cryogenic safety and mitigation of 
oxygen deficiency hazards. Longer tunnels may create 
new problems not found at present accelerators. 
Ionization Cooling Technology-The use of ionization 
cooling in a liquid hydrogen (LH2) medium is under 
consideration for some facilities. While in some ways this 
is preferable to the use of toxic materials, the 
fire/explosion hazard associated with LH2 must be 
adequately addressed. 
High Power Lasers-The use of high power lasers in the 
new facilities to manipulate particle beams or as photon 
sources presents potential hazards that must be addressed 
at an early stage in accordance with specific standards.  
Emergency Response/Life Safety Considerations-The 
longer tunnels at larger depths under consideration pose 
special problems of this kind that need to be successfully 
resolved. For example, special means of underground 
communication will need to be provided, possible refuge 
locations incorporated, and adequate means of transport 
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of both healthy and injured personnel to the surface 
established. 
Fire Performance Characteristics of Materials-In view 
of the tunnel lengths and egress conditions, enhanced 
importance must be attached to the hazards associated 
with the toxicity and corrosiveness of smoke from 
burning plastics, both halogenated and halogen-free. 
Thus, fire performance characteristics, or effective means 
for mitigation, are important considerations in the 
selection of materials. 
3.3 Radiation Safety and Environmental 
Protection 
Prompt Radiation Shielding-All future accelerators will 
require significant thicknesses of passive shielding to 
attenuate prompt radiation to levels acceptable to the 
members of the public, with details dependent upon the 
particle type (lepton versus hadron) and the beam power. 
As at present accelerators, neutron shielding will 
generally dominate laterally while muon shielding may 
dominate longitudinally. The shielding needs must be 
well-defined in early shielding design studies to be 
accurately reflected in the NEPA analysis. 
Department of Energy and other federal requirements 
are not completely clear concerning radiation fields 
beyond the boundaries of DOE sites. DOE has specified 
an annual limit of 100 mrem (1 mSv) on the radiation 
dose equivalent that can be received by general "non-
radiation" workers and members of the public[1,3]. This 
limit applies to that received by actual people or to 
locations where people could reasonably be present. 
Special reporting requirements apply if the annual dose 
equivalent received by an individual exceeds 10 mrem 
(0.1 mSv)[3]. For comparison, in the U.S. the average 
dose equivalent received by an individual from natural 
sources is about 300 mrem (3 mSv)[4]. In view of public 
concerns and these requirements, the design of new 
facilities should minimize exposures to members of the 
public. Higher limits at underground locations 
inaccessible to people but beyond the surface footprint of 
a laboratory might be allowed. However, it would be best 
to have the limits specified prior to the NEPA analysis. 
While many shielding problems are conventional, new 
ones may arise. First, the likely large dimensions of a new 
facility coupled with the long ionization ranges and 
enhanced importance of the range-straggling of muons of 
increased energies require that the curvature and profile of 
the earth’s surface be taken into account to adequately 
range them out. Second, for some facilities the prompt 
radiation dose due to neutrinos is a new consideration of 
significance[5]. Both of these issues could significantly 
impact the selection of the "footprint" of property needed 
by the facility. 
Residual Radioactivity-New accelerators will result in 
unprecedented levels of beam power, a reliable figure of 
merit for radioactivation. The consequences of high 
residual activity levels need to be addressed in early 
design stages of collimation systems, targets, ionization 
cooling apparatus, and places of high beam loss. The use 
of "unusual" metals such as lithium or mercury as targets 
merits specific attention. Remote handling equipment may 
become necessary on a large scale. The minimization of 
the generation of radioactive wastes to avoid the creation 
of so-called "mixed wastes" is vital. 
Airborne Radioactivity-Stringent federal regulations 
limit the annual dose equivalent to 10 mrem (0.1 mSv) to 
any member of the public from airborne releases of 
radioactivity from DOE facilities such as accelerators, 
with yet more stringent thresholds for monitoring and 
reporting[6]. This may be a major issue for future 
facilities, best addressed in the design stage. 
Radioactivity in Soil and Groundwater-The placement 
of any of the future facilities in either the glacial till or 
underlying bedrock requires that the production of 
radioactivity in these hydrogeologic units be given careful 
attention, especially with enhanced beam power. Prior to 
selecting the exact footprint, the hydrogeologic studies 
mentioned in Section 2.2 should determine relevant 
parameters precisely, as local variabilities can be large. 
The objective is to be able to protect groundwater 
resources and confidently address public concerns. 
4 SUMMARY 
All new facilities under consideration result in a 
number of challenges in ES&H. Some have been 
effectively addressed in the past while others will need 
new solutions. Given the new scale and nature of possible 
facilities some of these issues may be more important than 
in the past. It is concluded here that with sufficient 
planning in the design stages, these problems can be 
adequately addressed in a manner that merits the support 
of DOE, and the public. We acknowledge the helpful 
comments of our colleagues on this paper; Deborah 
Grobe, Timothy Miller, and Kamran Vaziri of Fermilab 
and Jonathon Cooper of DOE. 
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